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Determinants and consequences of board size: conditional indirect effects 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses the resource dependency theory, agency theory and contingency theory to 
propose indirect effects of organization size on organizational performance via board size, 
conditional on industry. Specifically, it proposes the following: a positive relationship between 
organization size and board size; a positive relationship between board size and organizational 
performance; the moderating effect of industry on the organization size–board size and board 
size–organizational performance relationships; the indirect effect between organization size and 
organizational performance via board size; and this indirect effect is conditional on industry. The 
paper contributes to the field of corporate governance by theorizing the determinants and 
consequences of board size, leading to a more precise assessment of the board’s performance.  
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Introduction 
Given the significance of board size as a dimension of corporate governance, a body of literature 
has investigated the determinants and consequences of board size, with more interest shown in 
the latter (see meta analysis Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999) . The determinants 
studied include organization size, organization age, growth opportunities, growth, diversification 
and firm complexity (e.g. Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja, 2007; Coles, Danielb and Naveen, 
2008; Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2009; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008). The consequences studied 
include corporate reputation (Musteen, Datta and Kemmerer, 2010) and environmental reporting 
(Rao, Tilt and Lester, 2012), but predominantly focus on organizational performance using 
measures such as accounting-based and market-based financial performance measures (e.g. 
Adams, Mansi and Nishikawa, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Kim, Cha, Cichy, Kim and 
Tkach, 2012). This body of literature provides conflicting findings: positive impact on 
performance (e.g. Adams and Mehran, 2012; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Kim et al., 2012; Sahu 
and Manna, 2013), negative impact on performance (e.g. Adams et al., 2009; Bai, 2013; Cheng, 
2008; Kumar and Singh, 2013; Liang, Xu and Jiraporn, 2013), U-shaped impact on performance 
(e.g. Coles et al., 2008) and inverted U-shaped impact on performance (e.g. Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak, 2012). Inconclusive findings have encouraged tests of moderating effects on the 
board size–organizational performance relationship. Some of the moderating variables studied 
are: organization size (O’Connell and Cramer, 2010), complexity/advising needs (Coles et al., 
2008), for-profit/not-for-profit status (Bai, 2013), organizational form (Adams et al., 2009), 
politically-connected directors (Menozzi, Gutiérrez Urtiaga and Vannoni, 2012), pre-global 
financial crisis/post-global financial crisis, and market power (Pathan and Faff,  2013).  
 
This study presents the following predictions: a positive relationship between organization size 
and board size; a positive relationship between board size and organizational performance based 
on the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer, 1972) and agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989); the 
moderating effect of industry on the organization size–board size and board size–organizational 
performance relationships based on contingency theory (Galbraith, 1973); the indirect effect 
between organization size and organizational performance via board size; and the indirect effect 
between organization size and organizational performance is conditional on industry (see Figure 
1).  
<Insert Figure 1 approx here> 
 
Theories and hypotheses development 
 
Organization size and board size 
 
The responsibilities of a board of directors include: selecting a CEO; advising on the 
development and implementation of corporate strategic plans; monitoring top management’s 
running of the corporation; regularly assessing the backgrounds, skills and abilities of its 
members as part of succession planning; and engaging with shareholders and other stakeholders 
(Business Roundtable, 2012). Advising and monitoring are perhaps the two most important 
functions (Business Roundtable, 2012; Linck et al., 2008). 
Advising involves helping the organization’s top management team in establishing goals and 
developing strategies (Department of Social Services, 2010). As an organization grows, the 
complexities of its various functions increase exponentially. These large and complex 
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organizations need a more hierarchical structure (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The increased 
complexities also require a larger board with members having expertise and knowledge in 
various areas (Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008). A large board can handle and process the 
huge amount and depth of information on the complex operations (Boone et al., 2007). 
Moreover, large organizations engage in sophisticated technologies, mergers and acquisitions 
(Lehn et al., 2009).  
 
Monitoring is about overseeing shareholders’ interests by making sure that the top management 
team and other managers are implementing the strategies and leading the organization in the 
right direction to achieve set goals (Business Roundtable, 2012). It also requires boards to ensure 
that management is refining the strategies and implementing them successfully. As organizations 
grow, the board’s monitoring role also becomes more complex and difficult due to the 
diversification, scale and scope of operations. The geographical dispersion, products/services 
diversification and the huge financial stakes involved require a large board to perform the 
monitoring role. Thus, it is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Organization size is positively associated with board size. 
 
Moderating effect of industry on the organization size–board size relationship 
 
Organization size determines the board size due to the complexities involved in governing a 
large organization. However, industry adds to some of those complexities and may moderate the 
strength of the positive organization size–board size relationship. Due to several push factors 
(need for a large board) and pull factors (value in a large board), manufacturing organizations 
have larger boards than services organizations.   
 
Manufacturing and services organizations diverge on a number of factors, such as the degree of 
direct involvement of customers in the production and delivery of products/services, and the 
customization of products/services (Jiang, 2009; Schmenner, 1986). Manufacturing 
organizations also tend to have high levels of the following complexities: logistical, 
technological, organizational and environmental (Khurana, 2014). One of the most significant 
challenges facing manufacturing organizations is to deal with these complexities (Humphlett, 
2014); a large board can help with this. For instance, a large board can bring high levels of social 
capital that can help manage the environmental complexities and provide valuable connections to 
procure materials, improving logistics (Pfeffer, 1972). Similarly, a large board can help tighten 
the monitoring of a manufacturing organization’s complex and diverse operations (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Moreover, the optimal board size is a trade-off between the costs and benefits 
associated with the size of the board which may vary across industries (Lehn et al., 2009). The 
costs of a large board include ‘free-riding’ and coordinating its decision-making process. The 
benefits include a variety of perspectives, additional information and insights. This paper argues 
that manufacturing organizations’ complexities allow them to benefit more from additional board 
members than services organizations. For instance, increasingly manufacturing organizations 
rely more on outsourcing than vertical integration (Sissons, 2011). A large board can provide 
valuable contacts with prospective efficient suppliers. Thus, the benefits of a large board 
outweigh its costs in a manufacturing organization, whereas in a services organization, the board 
size where the benefits offset the costs might be reached at a lower level. Thus, it is proposed: 
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Hypothesis 2. Industry moderates the strength of the positive relationship between 
organization size and board size such that the positive relationship is stronger in the 
manufacturing industry than in the services industry. 
 
Board size and organizational performance 
 
Resource dependency theory suggests that organizations depend on external actors in their 
environment for resources necessary for their survival and growth (Pfeffer, 1972). The level of 
dependency is conditional on the extent of the need for resources (e.g. specific raw material) and 
the number of sources of resources (i.e. single supplier or multiple suppliers) (Thompson, 1967). 
Organizations manage their environment to secure resources (e.g. their directors sit on the boards 
of supplier organizations called interlocking directorates) or reduce dependency on external 
actors (e.g. through vertical integration). The strategic nature of boards makes them suitable to 
connect with the environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). A large board can help the 
organization through board members’ connections with external actors in the environment such 
as suppliers and business customers (Pfeffer, 1972). Through interlocking directorates, board 
members can provide valuable advice to management to secure important contracts. Large 
boards are more likely to have more interlocking directorates; thus in comparison to small 
boards, large boards are likely to perform the advising role in a better way (Dalton et al., 1999). 
 
Agency theory suggests that there is an inherent conflict of interest between the principal 
(shareholders) and agents (management) (Eisenhardt, 1989). While shareholders want to 
maximize their returns, management may be more interested in their own gains. Therefore, board 
members need to play the important role of monitoring the behaviours of management leading to 
the attainment of objectives set in the strategic planning process. A large board is likely to 
perform the monitoring role in an effective manner as more directors will be involved in this 
process (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Boards can operate by forming various committees based on 
the expertise of the board members. These committees can include governance committee, audit 
committee, nomination committee, remuneration committee, compliance committee, and risk 
committee (Corporate Governance Council, 2014). Therefore, a large board with directors 
having a range of expertise would help perform the various complicated roles in a more efficient 
manner than a smaller board doing all the work as one group. Thus, it is proposed:     
 
Hypothesis 3. Board size is positively associated with organizational performance. 
 
Moderating effect of industry on the board size–organizational performance relationship 
 
The strength of the positive board size–organizational performance relationship is contingent on 
the industry. A large board should add more value in manufacturing organizations than in 
services organizations due to the inherent complexities involved in a manufacturing organization. 
Large boards can help deal with the complexities of logistics, technology, organization and 
environment in manufacturing organizations (Khurana, 2014). For instance, a large board 
comprising industry experts, former CEOs of competitors, customers or supplier organizations, 
and interlocking directorates can help improve the complex supply chains which are vital in a 
manufacturing organization (Humphlett, 2014). Similarly, the interconnected, yet somewhat 
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independent, and geographically-dispersed operations based on various technologies add to the 
technological complexities in manufacturing organizations. These complex technologies, along 
with the increasingly more common global value chain and greater proportions of knowledge-
intensive input (Sissons, 2011), require multiple directors with know-how of those technologies 
and the global value chain. Moreover, manufacturing organizations perceive greater changes in 
their environment than services organizations (Rant, 2007). A large board with a diverse set of 
experiences in dealing with environmental factors might help manufacturing organizations to 
deal with those environmental changes. 
 
Compared to small boards, large boards perform the advising and monitoring roles in a more 
effective manner (see theoretical arguments leading to Hypothesis 3). These effective advising 
and monitoring functions should have a larger impact on organizational performance in 
manufacturing organizations than in services organizations. For instance, manufacturing 
organizations develop strategies and restructure their organizations to introduce innovations, 
compared to services organizations that tend to do this less formally (Ettlie and Rosenthal, 2011). 
Proper advising from a large board in a manufacturing organization is especially important in 
these cases. Similarly, the benefits of tighter monitoring by a large board of a manufacturing 
organization outweigh the costs of such monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983); this happens in 
services organizations as well, but the net positive effect (benefits minus costs) of such tighter 
monitoring might be smaller in services organizations. Therefore, a manufacturing organization, 
due to its complexities, will benefit more from a large board than a services organization with a 
similar-sized board. Thus, it is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 4. Industry moderates the positive relationship between board size and 
organizational performance such that the positive relationship is stronger in the 
manufacturing industry than in the services industry. 
 
Indirect effects between organization size and performance 
 
Organization size may have a positive impact on organizational performance. Large 
organizations benefit from economies of scale (Katrishen and Scordis, 1998). They may 
influence their environment and thus may be able to reduce their dependency on it (Starbuck, 
1965). Some of that effect might be enacted through a larger board with greater levels of 
connections with the organizations in its environment. Based on the arguments presented for a 
positive relationship between organization size and board size (Hypothesis 1), and a positive 
relationship between board size and organizational performance (Hypothesis 3), it is proposed 
that there is an indirect relationship between organization size and organizational performance 
via board size. No prior research has tested this indirect relationship. Thus, it is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 5. Board size mediates the positive relationship between organization size 
and organizational performance. 
 
Conditional indirect effects between organization size and performance 
 
Based on the preceding arguments regarding a positive indirect effect of organization size on 
organizational performance via board size (Hypothesis 5), and the moderating effects of industry 
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on the organization size–board size relationship (Hypothesis 2) and the board size–organizational 
performance relationship (Hypothesis 4), the positive indirect effect of organization size on 
organizational performance (via board size) will be conditional on industry. The positive indirect 
effect will be stronger in the manufacturing industry than in the services industry. No prior 
research has tested such a conditional indirect relationship. Thus, it is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 6. Industry moderates the indirect positive relationship between organization 
size and organizational performance via board size such that the positive indirect effects 
are stronger in the manufacturing industry than in the services industry. 
 
Discussion 
 
This paper has several theoretical, research, practice and policy implications. First, the arguments 
put forward for the mediating effects of board size in the organization size-organizational 
performance relationship provide new insights into how organization size affects the 
performance of an organization. Similarly, the proposed moderating effects of industry on the 
organization size–board size and board size–performance relationships can help refine theories. 
These refined theories may predict differences across industries. A qualitative study focusing on 
how boards function differently in the two industries could provide valuable insights into the 
theoretical framework. Second, the conditional indirect effects model presented in this paper may 
generate a stream of research investigating such conditional indirect effects models between 
organization size and performance. The research in this direction may incorporate additional 
mediators (e.g. top management team) and moderators (e.g. organization life cycle stage, 
interlocking directorates, and corporate regulations). The research in this direction can also 
benefit from including second stage parallel mediators between board size and performance such 
as advising and monitoring. 
 
Third, future research on these conditional indirect effects models can provide some support for 
the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer, 1972) and agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
current paper focused on the two ends of the continuum: board size and organizational 
performance. Direct support for the resource dependency theory would include the intervening 
processes such as directors’ social and business networks and how they help secure important 
resources or manage the environment. Similarly, direct support for agency theory would require 
demonstrating how a large board can be effective in monitoring a firm’s management. A test of 
the moderating effects of industry can may provide some support for contingency theory 
(Galbraith, 1973). Fourth, the proposed indirect effects model suggests that the nomination 
committee should consider organization size to determine the optimal size of its board. While a 
growing organization would need a larger board, this paper indicates that these requirements 
vary across industries. Thus, this paper provides theoretical arguments for the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council’s second principle regarding the size of the board appropriate for its 
effective functioning (Australian Securities Exchange, 2012). Not all best governance practices 
are predicted by theories and supported by empirical evidence (Dalton & Dalton, 2005). 
Research indicates that organizations that follow more ASX Corporate Governance Council’s 
principles outperform their counterparts (Brown & Gørgens, 2009).  
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Fifth, in following the recommendation regarding periodically evaluating the performance of a 
board (Corporate Governance Council, 2014), directors should take into account the effect of 
board size and industry. Considering these will provide a more precise assessment of the board’s 
performance in a particular industry. Focusing on performance is one of the features of good 
corporate governance (Department of Social Services, 2010). Sixth, a policy implication of this 
model is that Australia should continue to introduce industry-specific regulations (Lawrence & 
Stapledon, 1999) and make the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s principles more industry-
based (Australian Securities Exchange, 2012). The conditional indirect effects model of this 
paper provides a more comprehensive analysis of the determinants and effects of board size, 
directors to see the bigger picture and the connections between various elements. 
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